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Abstract
Good policy making is an art. It involves a substantial element of personal
judgement about risks and consequences of alternative courses of actions and decisions. It is also a science because it requires systematic gathering and analysis
of evidence about a policy issue, and rational assessment of costs and benefits
of various ways of addressing the issue. However, in a crisis, there is little time
to gather evidence or to search for imaginative solutions to a problem. There is
a tendency, in such a situation, to act under pressure rather than on the basis of
evidence, analysis or informed judgement. Furthermore, a crisis often creates a
situation in which policy makers receive all sorts of advice. This note discusses
a set of concepts, originating mainly from economics, that can be used to assess
soundness of policy and advice, particularly during a crisis. These are concepts of
rationality, sustainability, inclusiveness, feasibility, practicality and tipping, which
can be used in decision making in normal and crisis times to reduce risks of disastrous advice or policy.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: D78
Keywords: Policy, risk and uncertainty, crisis, prudence, tipping.

1.

INTRODUCTION1

A crisis is characterized by an unfavorable state of instability or disequilibrium, i.e., by a large
negative deviation from the normal state of affairs. The instability can occur gradually, as when a
country slips into deep poverty due to decades of economic mismanagement; or it can occur
suddenly, as when for example, a country is hit by a negative external trade shock (e.g., a fall in
the price of a major export good) or by a natural disaster such as bad weather or earthquake. In
such situations, there is urgency in taking decisions or actions; first to restore equilibrium, and
second, to advance pre-crisis level of welfare. Measures directed at restoration of equilibrium or
stability are typically known as adjustment or stabilization policies, and those aimed at
improving pre-crisis welfare can be viewed as development policies. Development or routine
policies are framed and implemented in normal times, while adjustment policies are undertaken
in crisis situations. A crisis is not only an emergency -- something requiring an immediate
response, but it also has a further feature, that the appropriate response is usually unknown. It is
this uncertainty feature that makes the design of adjustment policies extremely difficult. Thus,
care should be exercised in making and implementing such policies. In itself, a crisis is
undesirable, because it lowers welfare. However, in a crisis situation, a policy response to it
presents the risk of worsening the prevailing welfare, but also the opportunity to improve welfare
far beyond its pre-crisis level. Thus, a crisis has two conflicting aspects. Its negative impact or
the threat of such impact is a bad thing, while the opportunity for improvement that it presents is
a desirable thing. More generally, policy can harm or benefit the population in normal or crisis
periods depending on how it is designed and implemented. However, the risks for harm and
opportunities for gain are greater in crisis periods.
Ideally, public policy should never harm the nation and its people.2 Its intended purpose is to
advance the common good, unless it is in the hands of decision-makers who are not responsive to
1

A previous and more detailed draft of this paper was presented in March 2003 at an induction seminar organized
by the Office of the President for the then newly appointed Cabinet of the Government of Kenya. The then VicePresident, Hon, Kinjana Wamalwa requested the authors to complete the paper and circulate to the Cabinet and
senior civil servants. He particularly wanted the idea of prudent policy making articulated. Unfortunately, many
policies initiated by the new government of Kenya in response to various crisis situations fail to meet the conditions
of prudence. We dedicate this note to Hon. Wamalwa who passed away not long after the induction seminar.
1

public needs and concerns.3 However, policy can have disastrous outcomes if it is ill-conceived
or badly implemented. Since this risk is greatest during a period of crisis, how can one decide the
right thing to do in such a situation? This question applies to everyone -- an individual, the
family unit, the government, etc. In many ways, this is the ultimate survival question, because
the outcome of an action or an inaction in a crisis can be disastrous. There is no easy alternative
in a emergency situation. It is the hard choices inherent in a crisis, and their far-reaching
consequences, that are often the source of panic and poor judgement on the part of decisionmakers and advisors in such a period.
The aim of this note is to use basic economic analysis to unravel the steps and principles that can
be followed to make rational decisions in crisis situations. In view of the wide scope of the issue
involved, we restrict ourselves to crisis decisions and actions by policy-makers in government.
We make the simplifying assumption that an action follows automatically from a decision, so
that policy decisions and actions are used synonymously. We view advice, as a set of ideas that
guide policy makers in choosing from among policy options. Advice is given by experts, who
typically have no power to effect the advice. We view policy as a purposeful action or a credible
statement by persons in authority4. Advice precedes policy. That is, if knowledge is to be used to
inform policy, it must be available to policy makers beforehand. Advice is useless, if it is given
to policy makers after the fact.
2.
2

POLICY MAKING IN A CRISIS

Every public policy is associated with losers and gainers. However, the net effects should be positive benefits.
From a society’s point of view, benefits from a policy should be large enough to compensate the loses.
3
One of the basic premises of Public Choice School is that individuals act on their self- interest whether in public or
private settings. As such, decision makers select those choices that maximize their own utility subject to institutional
constraints. Unless institutions of governance that constrain their behavior are in place, policy choices may largely
benefit a few people at the expense of the general population. The case of the rare benevolent dictator
notwithstanding, we assume democratic institutions of governance exist, and the primary intent of public policy
under these institutions is to maximize social welfare.
4
Policy is also variously defined as (a) "a definite course of action or method of action selected from among
alternatives in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions"; (b) "what is
articulated, whether in writing or by word of mouth"; (c) "what is done, whether it has been stated before or not"; (d)
"only such actions that are sustained"; (e) "purposeful statements, written or spoken, aimed at solving a particular
problem" (see Gitu, 2001). While policy is made by rulers, its implementation is the responsibility of its agents.
Good policy promotes good governance and advances the general well-being of the population while bad policy has
the opposite effect. Unfortunately, both the science and art of good policy making are rare among researchers and
decision makers, and this situation might account for much of the poverty observed in the world.
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During normal times, such as characterized by peace, social and policy stability or when the
economy of a nation is experiencing steady economic growth, adherence to existing policy is
often the norm. Policy focus then is on routine management of the economy to ensure that
existing conditions prevail or improve slowly. Under such conditions, policy is conducted
without much urgency: the public is content and demands for action are often limited to marginal
changes in the policy direction. In fact, policy makers are often encouraged to stay on course.
During such good times, policy advisers have the luxury of time to consider and evaluate
alternative policies that would make the situation better or at least ensure that things remain as
are. As a matter of fact, such times afford policy makers the opportunity to experiment with
marginal changes in policy with little fear for adverse consequences. The textbook prescription
of policy making fits well during such good times. It is fair to say that most policy advisors are
trained to offer advice to governments assuming normal state of affairs.
However, during a crisis, as for example when there is widespread social unrest, or when an
economy is in a deep recession, this textbook approach fails. Crisis brings forth a need for
urgent action and results.5 It is also a time when error in policy choice can be extremely costly.
More specifically, during crisis, both Type I error (accepting bad advice) and Type II error
(rejecting good advice) have much more serious implications than is the case during normal
times.6 For reasons discussed below, times of crisis also associate with a high probability of
committing both types of errors in policy choice. Policy makers must therefore not only rely on
credible advisors but must also have a systematic way of evaluating the soundness of advice that
they receive from experts.

5

As of the time of writing the first draft of this note, the new Kenyan Government was faced with various sorts of
crisis situations. Most important was an economy in terrible condition as evidenced by high unemployment and
poverty and stagnant growth. Likewise, the country was experiencing various incidences of social unrest most
important being the Mungiki menace, uncertainties about the new constitution and labour unrest. All these issues
required urgent actions and public expected immediate results.
6
A good example of the seriousness of making errors during crisis can be illustrated by the familiar case of
convicting an innocent person for murder which caries a death penalty. In a case where a person is charged with
murder, finding him guilty while he is in fact innocent result in serious consequences—hanging an innocent
person—an irreversible action. Thus, those types of cases call for very careful scrutiny of the evidence. We equate
the gravity of an error in policy advice during crisis to that of convicting an innocent person for murder.
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Policy choice during crisis demands special attention because mistakes can make the crisis worse
with serious consequences on the well-being of the population. We use the concept of “tipping”
to characterize the irreversible negative impact of wrong polices during a period of crisis.
Tipping is used here to imply a situation whereby a condition accelerates in the wrong direction
as a result of policy action or inaction. One could think of the case of an economy in a severe
recession or depression as being in a crisis state. During such times of economic crisis, policy
concern must be to halt the decline and reverse the downward trend. Policy mistakes during
such times result in an acceleration of the decline in economic performance making it even more
difficult for the economy to recover and plunging the population into widespread suffering.
Likewise, in times of social crisis, policy choices could tip the social condition, resulting in a
social tragedy. For example, organized social unrest by small groups could easily degenerate
into civil war if inappropriate measures are taken. It is because of this “tipping” effect of wrong
policy in undesirable direction, and with disastrous consequences, that we consider policy
making during a crisis to be unique, and deserving of systematic thinking. We can therefore
define good policy during times of crisis as that policy with a “zero” or low probability of
tipping over the existing condition into a worse state.
Policy making during times of crisis is even more complicated because the demand for action is
very high. Policy makers are expected to act fast to deal with the crisis. The public demand for
results imparts political pressure for urgent response. Given such pressure, policy makers are
inclined to take measures that are expected to have a high positive impact and thus resolving the
crisis. We suggest that, just like investment options with high returns also have high risks,
policies that can have a major impact in reversing a crisis also associate with a high risk of
failure — that is high probability of tipping. We do not equate “successful” policies with “good”
policies (see e.g., Jaffe, 1975; Peacock, 1992; Jones and Cullis, 1991; Peacock, 1984; 1977;
1993). In other words, although an investor can place all his assets in high risk-high return
investments and actually be successful thereby increasing his net worth, one should consider that
the probability of bankruptcy at the time of investment is very high. In as far as public policy is
concerned, success of such high risk actions does not represent good policy because of the
associated high probability of tipping the welfare of society.. The interaction between pressure
to act and the promise of rapid problem resolution increases the probability that policy makers
4

will opt for high risk policies during times of crisis. Crisis tempts otherwise prudent policy
makers to behave like gamblers. There is need to design an institutional mechanism (such as
crisis resolution committees) for insuring policy making against decision behaviors associated
with tipping (see below).
Another dimension of policy-making that complicates the choice process during crisis has to do
with the supply of policy proposals. A crisis creates experts of all sorts. The deeper the crisis, the
larger the supply of “expert” opinion. On the one hand, the policy makers face demands to act,
and on the other, they are offered numerous suggestions and are therefore expected to act and do
so fast. Unfortunately, most of the policy proposals that are made to the policy makers are
poorly informed. In a crisis, most proposals fall under what might be called “folk” policies. Folk
policies are not based on any scientific evidence of "cause-and-effect" or clearly demonstrated
relationships. Instead, folk policies are based on beliefs, practices, casual evidence and value
judgements (Ng, 1972). The basis for folk economics or science for example, are mere beliefs as
to how the economy or the world works. Folk policies offer little guidance in complicated
matters, as they contain elements of common knowledge and experiences with no innovation.
They are likely to be a large menu of mostly high risk policies.
3.

STANDARD POLICY ACTIONS DURING A CRISIS

In a crisis situation, well intentioned policy advisors are inclined to recommend one of the
following courses of actions or policies:
•

Shock therapies;

•

Incremental or gradual steps;

•

Radical actions.

We provide a brief description of each of the above policy categories below.

5

The idea of “shock therapy” is derived from the medical field. It is the type of treatment provided
to patients in extreme emergency cases such as a heart attack or when there are few treatment
options for an illness. It is also the type of treatment given to a substance addict by suddenly
withdrawing the whole of the substance from the subject. A shock therapy can either cure or kill.
It has no intermediate outcome. It is thus a very risky course of action to take. A particular
characteristic of shock therapy is that once a situation gets worse, there is little else that can be
done. The action is irreversible. It is a once and for all action.
A radical action or policy can be seen as one that changes the way of doing things in an almost
the opposite direction. In a country characterized by large inequities in the distribution of key
productive resource such as land, a radical policy would be one that implements land
redistribution by a decree. While achieving the intended outcome, a radical policy often creates
many other problems — it could, for example, lead to a drastic fall in output or create social
tensions. Likewise, during times when interest rates and prices are escalating, a radical policy
would be to institute controls in form of price ceilings. Here again the policy creates numerous
other unintended outcomes though initial objective (lower prices and interests rates) may appear
to be achieved. Again, the policy achieves that narrow objective but creates numerous other
unintended outcomes. Radical policies can be reversed though the costs of policy reversal can be
very high. By and large, the short-run gains that accrue as a result of radical policies dissipate
rapidly as they are not sustainable.
Incrementalism or gradualism is to an extent the opposite of radicalism. It is the type of policy
making characterized by marginal changes in existing policy. During a crisis, such an approach
to policy may only have limited impact, as it does not lead the economy or the country away
from its previous trajectory. The problem with such measures is that they may not bring about
the required changes.
The pressure to show results tends to make shock therapy and radical policies attractive to policy
advisors and makers. Such policies are easy to sell to policy makers who are keen to maximize
popularity by showing some quick wins. We suggest that these policies are not generally suitable
6

during times of crisis and a higher level of scrutiny is called for before making or implementing
them.
The above policy measures appear mutually exclusive only under a casual examination. For
example, it may not be necessary to apply only radical or only gradual measures in reforming
economies. Radical and gradual policies can be applied simultaneously or can be sequenced to
achieve well thought out objectives. With regard to the first point (complementary application of
dissimilar policies), a radical measure can be directed at one problem in the economy, while a
gradual one is being aimed at another problem. For example, in a financial reform, interest rates
can be decontrolled overnight (a radical measure), even as bank deregulation is introduced
gradually (an incremental reform). An example in which radical and gradual reforms are used in
sequence is also easy to find. Immediate removal of destitute families and children from the
streets, followed by their gradual rehabilitation into worlds of work and schooling, is a perfect
example of sequencing of radical and incremental policies in a way that is consistent with shortand long-term public interests (see below). An appropriate response in a crisis situation is one
that addresses the urgency of the moment, while at the same time searching for a better and longterm solution.

4. PRUDENCE IN A CRISIS SITUATION
Given the high cost associated with the adoption of wrong policies during crisis, we suggest that
policies adopted in such a period should at least meet the conditions of prudence. We define
prudent policies as those policies that are least likely to be disruptive of a nation and its people.
Such policies are robust in principles of feasibility and practicality.
We outline below decision rules that can increase chances of making and implementing prudent
policies in a crisis situation.
Adherence to a small set of ideas when making policy decisions can reduce extreme risks
associated with policies in periods of crisis. These are concepts of risk averting attitude (not
7

behavior), diversification behavior, sustainability, inclusiveness, fall-back strategies, broad
feasibility and calmness in the midst of a crisis.
A policy is prudent if it can be said to be:
a.

Averse to excessive risks, i.e., it should not plunge the country into chaos or extreme
dangers if it fails. A risk averting attitude on the part of policy makers and advisors is
more likely to avoid disastrous policies compared with a risk taking attitude. There is
need, therefore, for policy makers and advisors to cultivate or develop risk averting
temperaments. We take it as axiomatic that such attitudes or temperaments can be
learned or acquired. The difficulty of course is that attitudes are not observable and so
one cannot differentiate individuals by their attitudes towards risk. However, a record of
the nature of a policy maker's decisions can reveal her/his attitudes towards risk. This
information can be useful in selecting members of decision committees (see below).
The idea here is to weigh the beneficial consequence of each policy option with the
associated dangers. For example, a policy option with a large potential benefit might also
be highly dangerous, while a policy yielding smaller benefits might carry modest risks of
harm. In this case, the risk averting nature of prudence dictates a preference for the policy
with smaller benefits. From this standpoint, doing nothing and maintaining the existing
status quo might be a prudent policy. However, a policy of a status quo would be most
imprudent if it sacrifices opportunities for a large gain to avoid small risks. Since
decisions are always made in the context of uncertainty, the concept of prudence dictates
that policies under contemplation be assessed based on probabilities of risks and benefit
opportunities associated with them. The probabilities can be objective, or they can simply
be degrees of belief as to magnitudes of risks and opportunities associated with particular
policies.

b.

Diversified, i.e., comprises different elements or strategies, all aimed at achieving a given
objective. In this case, some strategies would be high risk and others would be low risk.
The manner in which such a policy is designed and implemented ensures that extreme
risk is avoided. For example, if a high risk strategy fails, as a low risk one succeeds, the
attendant loss would be mitigated by benefits of the successful strategy. A concrete and
8

well-known example of a diversified policy is a trade policy based on many export
commodities rather than one dominant crop such as coffee or tea. A policy consisting of
military and diplomatic initiatives in resolution of a border dispute is another example.
c.

Politically sustainable, i.e., maintained over political regimes or over several
development periods. A policy option that is likely to find support in different political
regimes is likely to be based on long-term national considerations rather than on
expediency or short-term objectives of a particular regime. A policy based on long-term
goals has an inherent tendency of avoiding disastrous outcomes of measures intended to
achieve short-term ends of a given regime.

d.

Inclusive, i.e., based on inputs from different cross-sections of society. The idea here is
that crisis decisions, albeit their urgency, should not be left to one person or to a few
individuals, but should be made by a committee comprising a representative group of
individuals. To the extent possible, there should be wide participation by citizens in such
decisions, through debates by civil society, non-government organizations and elected
representatives of the people. Moreover, incidence of benefits or costs of the decisions
made should be widely shared in society. This implies that mechanisms for sharing such
benefits and costs should be available.

e.

Supported by a fall-back strategy, i.e., it specifies the course of action that would be
taken if the preferred or the first best strategy were to fail. A fall-back strategy can be a
second-best option, an exit strategy or a plan to terminate the policy whenever it becomes
evident that it would not work. Thus, there are three alternative elements of a fall-back
strategy. One might involve a plan to exit from a failed program of action or from
unworkable manifesto. The second could be a plan to terminate a policy once its failure is
imminent. And a third element might comprise a different program of action, which
differs in risks and opportunities from the preferred action. A prudent policy should
contain all the three elements. Ordinarily, policy makers and policy advisors do not
consider a comprehensive set of fall-back strategies because of the pressure to act fast.
The impatience involved in crisis decisions is often the source of disastrous consequences

9

often associated with such decisions. The necessity to have an exit strategy suggests that
choice of policies should also take into account the magnitude of sunk costs.7
f.

Feasible, i.e., can be implemented with available resources. However, a financially
feasible policy can fail to be implemented if it is not practical. For example, a policy for
elimination of child labor may remain on paper despite the availability of resources to
carry it out, if a mechanism for recruiting working children to schools and to
rehabilitation centers does not exist. Similarly, a program for rehabilitating street families
within a month may fail for practical reasons, such as non-availability of shelter, which
cannot be constructed in one month. Thus, practical or technological aspects of policy
decisions are as important as the conceptual, social, economic and inter-temporal
dimensions discussed earlier. Institutional arrangements are key in determining
practicality of policies. Since institutions are created by the polity or evolve out of social
norms and conventions (see North, 1990), feasibility of policies under a particular
institutional structure (comprising for example, a constitution, a legal system, manifestos
of political parties, prevailing social norms), is determined taking into account the
political realities of the day.

g.

An result outcome of a calm decision making process. A crisis tends to cause panic and
anxiety among policy makers because of the urgency of the response it requires. Under
such circumstances, there is danger that action or policy will be based on mere feelings
(e.g., anger, emotion, sympathy, impatience, fear etc.) or wishful thinking, rather than on
reasoning and analysis. It is important that policy makers and advisors be calm in a crisis
situation to facilitate careful consideration of key policy options. Rationality is the most
important calming device in a crisis situation. It introduces objectivity in a decision
process, i.e., the need to base decisions on evidence and reason. Further, it facilitates
selection of a policy that is in the best interest of society because by its very nature,
rationality demands that policy makers compare costs and benefits of alternative courses
of action8.

7

Simply, as economic theory teaches us, high sunk costs are a significant barrier to exit. We therefore take it that
policy choices that have low sunk costs are easier to exit from should the policy produce undesirable results.
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In order to use the above concepts in making decisions, it is important to institutionalize the
general process of making decisions of a polity nature. This institutionalization can be done by
constituting committees with mandates for making routine and emergency decisions. Thus, once
a decision matter has been identified as being of a particular type, it can be delegated to an
appropriate committee for consideration. The implication here is that even as urgent actions are
taken, there should be institutional mechanisms for managing a crisis, with long-term and broad
development goals in mind.
An important aspect of institutionalized decision committees is that they introduce calmness in
decision making, especially in crisis situation. Calmness avoids haphazardness in arriving at
policy conclusions. A committee is a good institutional mechanism for bringing calmness in
decision making process because its members are forced to rationalize their contributions so that
only the most compelling, or well reasoned or practical policy proposals would tend to be
accepted by all committee members or by the majority of the members. As a matter of routine,
the committee should always strive to be informed by evidence, facts, and by current scientific
knowledge as well as by moral arguments before arriving at policy conclusions. Emphasis on
rationality in decision-making should introduce calmness in decision committees and generally
lead to prudent policies.
5. REAL WORLD EXAMPLES OF CRISIS POLICIES
There are many examples in various parts of the world that can serve as excellent case studies of
policies in crisis situations. Land redistribution policies after independence or revolutionary
changes in political regimes are good examples. Land redistribution policies in the former Soviet
Union in the early part of the 20th Century are examples of policies designed and implemented in
crisis circumstances. Similar land redistribution policies characterized Kenya and Tanzania in the
early 1960s, China in the late 1940s, and Costa Rica in 1970s, just to mention a few cases.
Uganda's property confiscation policies of the 1970s are particularly worthy of note.

8

Since policy makers act on behalf of society, this is equivalent to stating that rationality in a decision process helps
policy makers maximize the social objective function.
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In some countries, policies made in periods of crisis resulted in extreme suffering of the
population, while in others they led to prosperity. Radical policies or those of the shock therapy
variety generally led to suffering while prudent policies improved living conditions (Appendix
Table 1). Some radical policies, that registered short-term successes, as in the former Soviet
Union, had long-term disastrous consequences. Appendix Table 1 depicts examples of crisis type
policies, their classification and consequences.
Appendix Table 1 is only an illustrative example of the types of policies that fit the policy
classifications in the text. It is by no means intended to be a detailed or an exhaustive list of
policy typologies. It is generally difficult to find prudent crisis policies because in a period of
crisis, policies tend to have a short-run orientation. The decision principles discussed in this note
are intended to guard against the temptation to go for disastrous policies or those that yield shortrun, unsustainable gains.
6. CONCLUION: JUDGING SOUNDNESS OF ADVICE AND POLICY
The components of prudence (e.g., risk aversion, feasibility, practicality) can be fruitfully used to
assess whether the expert advice being given or the policy being contemplated is sound or not. In
particular, the concept of risk aversion can be used to determine whether adverse consequences
of expert advice (and the attendant policy) are tolerable. Further, the concept of feasibility can be
employed to determine whether the policy being advocated is affordable. Judging policy in
relation to its practicality can reveal problems in its implementation. The main contribution of
this note is to provide rigorous and intuitive standards for judging whether an advice is sound or
not. The note can help determine whether the advice or policy is well considered, and whether,
its short- and long-run consequences are acceptable. The concepts can be used to evaluate any
advice or policy. The standards of decision-making discussed here constitute a mechanism for
forcing advisors and policy-makers to rationalize their positions individually or jointly even
when the subject matter of advice or policy is extremely urgent. The process of rationalization,
by its very nature, elevates the role of reason to that of the pillar of the decision making process,
thus reducing risks of ill-conceived policies. Indeed, casual policies are ruled out by the
decisions standards discussed here.
12

Expert advice, public policy and social welfare are closely linked. Bad advice can lead to
policies that are disastrous to the well-being of the population. It is thus of utmost importance
that advice and policies be carefully evaluated, especially in periods of crisis when human
judgment is most prone to error. The decision standards of prudence can be used to reduce
adverse consequences of public policies.
As a final remark, we emphasize the fact that policies that result in what may be called good
outcomes do not necessarily meet our standards of prudence. By definition, these policies are not
“good’ from the normative point of view as discussed in this paper. Currently in Kenya, the
government is implementing two radical (by our definition) policies that by all accounts are
considered a success. The first has been the demolition of buildings and other structures that are
constructed in areas reserved for public utilities. The second one has been the mandating of the
fitting of seatbelts on all public commuter vehicles. Both of these policies have been enacted in
response to what may be called crisis situations. While they have been implemented and many
consider them a success, these policies in our view are not prudent in that they do meet the
features of prudence. The policies may therefore not be sustained through different regimes; do
not appear to have undergone careful evaluation of benefits and costs; and there are clearly no
fallback strategies.

13
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APPENDIX TABLE
Table A1
A Typology of crisis policies in different parts of the world
Country or Region Classification
Short-run
Policy and Nature of Crisis
and Date
(radical,
performance
gradual, prudent (failed,
etc)
succeeded)
1. Land Reform due to political agitation Kenya, 1963-66
Prudent
Succeeded
after independence
2. Property confiscation
Uganda, 1971-74
Radical
Succeeded
3. Property nationalization after
Tanzania, 1967-70 Gradual
Succeeded
independence and declaration of a
socialist state
4. Reorganization of property rights by
Tanzania, 1961-73 Gradual
Failed
fiat and forced villagization under
pressure from socialist ideals
5. Kenyanization of private enterprises
Kenya, 1963-70
Gradual
Succeeded
and civil service under pressure from
interest groups in the face of rural-urban
migration and mounting urban
unemployment
6. Creation of state enterprises under
Developing
Gradual
Succeeded
pressure from socialist development
regions, 1960sideals
1980s
7. Structural adjustment programs in the Eastern European
Radical and
Succeeded
poor governance and growth
Countries and
shock therapies
USSR, 1990s
8. Structural adjustment under heavy
Sub-Saharan
Gradual
Succeeded

Long-run
Consequences
(good, bad,
disastrous, etc)
Good
Disastrous
Disastrous
Disastrous
Good

Bad to
Disastrous
Mixed
Bad

external debts and negative growth rates
9. Political liberalization under pressure
from opposition political parties and
international development agencies
10. Political liberalization under
pressure from armed opposition and
international opinion
11. Political liberalization under
pressure from armed under-class
12. Equal protection by government of
all citizens against demands from radical
political groups after independence
13. Inaction against ethnic violence
under pressure from special interest
groups
14. Foreign exchange and trade
liberalization under pressure from
Bretton Woods Institutions
15. Free and universal primary
education under pressure from NARC
campaign promises
16. Mandating seatbelts and speed
governors on commuter vehicles
17. Demolitions of private structures and
buildings on land reserved for public
utilities
18. Shoot to kill suspected thieves order
given by the Minister for National
Security, Kenya in response to rising
crime.

Africa, 1980-90s
Kenya, 1990-2002

Gradual

South Africa,
1960s-94

Gradual

Failed to
Change
Leadership
Succeeded

Good

Cuba

Radical

Succeeded

Good

South Africa, 1994 Prudent

Succeeded

Good

Kenya, 1990s

Gradual

Succeeded

Disastrous

Sub-Saharan
Africa

Gradual

Succeeded

Good

Kenya, 2003

Prudent

In progress

Not observed

Kenya 20044

Radical

In progress

Not observed

Kenya 2004

Radical

In progress

Not observed

Kenya 2005

Radical

Not yet
implemented

Not observed

Good
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